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Executive summary 
This paper addresses the question what determines management control in joint ventures.  
The model developed for this purpose draws on two existing frameworks.  The first, by 
Dekker (2004), shows how control in strategic alliances can be structured around two 
control problems, coordination of tasks and appropriation concerns, the latter stemming 
from transaction cost economics theory.  Dekker thereby differentiates between formal 
controls and the role of trust.  The second framework, by Zeng (2003), describes what 
drives the cooperative dilemma in joint ventures and is based on game theory.  The model 
developed in this paper substitutes Zeng’s cooperative dilemma for one of the control 
problems in Dekker’s framework.  The model is tested in a case study;  it appears that the 
extension with game theory helps explain the control mechanisms in the joint venture in 
more detail. 
 
 
1.   Introduction 
Joint ventures (JVs) make for an interesting paradox:  whereas the popularity of JVs is very 
high, the percentage of JVs that fail is very high too.  In a world of rapidly increasing 
global competition most multinational enterprises (MNEs) will have to participate in 
(international) joint ventures in order to remain competitive and strategically flexible.  
However, many joint ventures do not deliver the hoped-for results and fail.  The literature 
quotes a number of reasons why failure rates are high (e.g. Franko 1971;  Gomes-Casseres 
1987;  Pearce 1997). One of these reasons is management control problems (Sherman 1992;  
Groot and Merchant 2000;  Chalos and O’Connor 2004;  Porporato 2006).  The parent firms 
in a JV may well have differing interests.  Insufficient control over a JV can limit the 
ability of the parent to coordinate its activities, efficiently utilise its resources and to 
effectively implement its strategy. 
 
Interestingly, despite repeated remarks in the literature that management control is key to 
successful JV performance, it is an area that remains ‘under-researched’, (e.g. Groot and 
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Merchant 2000;  Kamminga 2003).  Given this situation, I propose the following principal 
research question:  What determines management control in JVs?  First, a literature review 
(chapter 2) demonstrates that whereas joint ventures have been looked at from many 
different theoretical perspectives, a holistic framework for analysis is still largely missing.  
Most studies only consider a certain aspect, such as justification for formation of JVs or 
performance of JVs, and findings are often contradictory.  Recently, various authors 
(Dekker 2004; Kamminga 2003; Kamminga and Van der Meer-Kooistra 2007) have presented 
analysis frameworks that combine transaction cost economics (TCE) theory with a number 
of elements borrowed from organisational (relational) theories.  Another, much more 
limited group of authors have used game theory to investigate joint ventures (Parkhe 
1993a;  Zeng 2003).  Game theory, with its well-known prisoner’s dilemma, is especially 
suited to shed light on the continuous struggle of balancing cooperative and competitive 
behaviours of the partners in a joint venture.  In chapter 3 I will argue that combining two 
existing frameworks, one based on TCE and organizational theory and the other based on 
game theory, leads to a more detailed model to explain management control in joint 
ventures.  I test the theoretical framework, in chapter 4, on a case study to see whether it 
can explain the observed phenomena.  It appears that the model can be used as a 
diagnostic tool to see whether the design of the management control system is adequate 
given the particularities of a joint venture.  Finally, chapter 5 contains my conclusions as 
well as some recommendations for further research. 
 
 
2.   Prior literature 
 
2.1   Introduction to joint venture research 
In the literature on joint ventures a plethora of theoretical perspectives have been 
employed.  Perhaps the most used theoretical perspective to explain formation and 
development of an IJV is transaction cost economics (TCE) (Williamson 1985).  This theory 
focuses on governance structures for transactions.  It maintains that a transaction can be 
governed by one of three structural mechanisms:  a market form with price mechanism, a 
hierarchical form with bureaucratic governance mechanisms, or a hybrid form.  The 
governance structure for a certain type of transaction will be the one with the lowest 
transaction costs (assuming equal production costs);  transaction costs are, for example, 
costs of negotiation, of preparing and writing contracts, and of monitoring and enforcing 
those.  The actual choice for a specific governance structure depends on certain 
characteristics of the transaction taking place (asset specificity, the frequency and size, 
and the uncertainty of the transaction) and certain characteristics of human nature 
(bounded rationality and opportunism).  There are a large number of hybrid governance 
structures, which consist of a mixture of market and hierarchical characteristics;  
examples include long-term supply arrangements or joint ventures.  According to this 
theory, joint ventures occur because the sum of production and transaction costs 
associated with joint ownership is lower than that of sole ownership (in the case of a 
wholly owned subsidiary) or of market transactions.  The joint venture structure offers 
advantages in terms of avoidance of high uncertainty caused by market failure and 
avoidance of high overhead costs of establishing hierarchies (Child et al. 2005).  TCE 
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theory emphasises the rational aspects of a transaction.  It does not take into 
consideration any relational aspects:  for example, how developing trust between partner 
firms may reduce opportunism and lead to more information sharing. 
 
Apart from TCE theory, many other theories have been applied to the study of joint 
ventures.  These theories can be broadly classified into economic theories and managerial 
or organizational theories, and aspects investigated can be divided into organization, 
operation and performance of JVs (Child et al. 2005;  Robson et al. 2002).  A 
comprehensive overview is provided in table 1.  In a meta-analysis of JV literature Robson 
et al. (2002) focused on the aspect of JV performance.  They concluded that findings from 
different studies on determinants of JV performance were often contradictory, and 
attributed this to the absence of an overall framework of analysis.  Some authors have 
turned to developing such overall framework and in the following sections I will discuss one 
of them. 
 
 
Table 1:  Alternative theoretical perspectives to investigate IJVs – economic theories  
(adapted from Robson et al. 2002;  Das and Teng 2000;  Child et al. 2005) 
 
Economic theories 
Theory Underlying logic Focal aspects Areas of concern 
Transaction 
cost 
economics 
(TCE) 
The sum of production 
and transaction costs 
associated with joint 
ownership is lower 
than that for sole 
ownership of the 
venture or for market 
transaction 
The size and division 
of exchange and 
production costs 
incurred, mitigation of 
the hazards of partner 
opportunism, the use 
of administrative 
procedures for 
control, and the 
alignment of financial 
incentives 
No account is taken of 
the fact that IJVs are 
intrinsically strategic 
and can embody many 
different parental 
motives. 
Lack of attention to 
relational aspects of 
IJV partnership 
Agency 
theory 
IJVs act as agents 
through which parent 
organizations (the 
principals) aim to 
increase their business 
activities and success.  
The principals act to 
control costs they 
attribute to the 
agency relationship 
Governance 
mechanisms that limit 
the agent’s self-
serving behaviour:  
principal and agent 
agendas may differ, 
leading to future 
conflict;  this is 
exacerbated by 
cultural distance and 
avoided via parent-
initiated control 
mechanisms 
Agency hazards 
constitute just one 
difficulty amidst the 
many facing IJV 
managers. 
The assumption that 
IJV managers serve 
their own purposes 
before those of the 
parent firm may not 
be pragmatic 
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Resource-
dependency 
theory 
IJVs form to create 
bundles of strategic 
and social resources 
that serve as a source 
of competitive 
advantage and, in 
turn, superior 
performance 
Achieving positional 
advantages on the 
basis of inter-firm 
resource 
complementarity, the 
scarcity of valuable 
firm resources, the 
coalitional nature of 
organizations, and the 
resource interface in 
IJVs 
A comprehensive set 
of sources of 
advantage has not yet 
been isolated in the 
general management 
literature; little has 
been determined in 
the case of 
collaborative strategy. 
Difficulty in testing an 
IJV performance 
model for this 
dynamic perspective 
using cross-sectional 
data 
Market 
power 
theory 
Firms can improve 
competitive success 
by securing stronger 
positions in their 
markets through 
cooperative strategy 
Distinction of 
cooperative 
strategies:  offensive 
vs. defensive, scale 
vs. link;  link between 
cooperative strategy 
and national and 
industrial context 
Static perspective that 
does not take into 
account how the 
relationship may 
develop over time 
(e.g. development of 
trust, overruling 
rational choices) 
Transaction 
value theory 
Combination of 
transaction cost 
theory and resource-
based theory:  focus 
on joint value 
maximization for the 
collaborative 
transaction (not pure 
cost minimization or 
revenue maximization)
Aspects that TCE 
theory cannot explain 
because of its pure 
cost focus:  e.g. 
situations where 
greater joint value is 
derived from less cost-
efficient structures;  
increasing transaction 
specificity can raise 
transaction value and 
lower risk of alliance 
break-up (whereas 
TCE points to more 
safeguards needed to 
avoid break-up) 
Largely the same as 
for TCE 
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Real options 
theory 
Treatment of IJVs as 
real call options on 
the opportunity to 
invest in a foreign 
market:  the buyer of 
the option holds the 
right to make a larger 
investment at a fixed 
price at a later date 
(when uncertainties 
are expected to be 
clarified) 
Explanation for fact 
that many alliances do 
end up in acquisitions 
Theory was developed 
for equity joint 
ventures;  whether 
other cooperative 
strategies (contractual 
arrangements, non-
equity partnerships) 
have option value 
remains unaddressed 
Increasing 
returns 
theory 
By acquiring a large 
market share early on, 
firms can lock in their 
customers and 
dominate the market 
without decreasing 
returns setting in (e.g. 
Microsoft) 
Rationale for 
developing 
technological 
networks, research 
consortia etc. 
Especially relevant for 
knowledge-based 
industries, much more 
so than for e.g. 
natural resource-
based industries 
 
 
Managerial/organizational theories 
Theory Underlying logic Focal aspects Areas of concern 
Behavioural 
perspective 
(relational 
contracting) 
The development and 
successful evolution of 
IJVs depends largely 
on behavioural 
interactions and the 
presence of goodwill 
among the parties 
involved 
Relational and 
interactional 
characteristics – such 
as trust, commitment, 
cooperation, and 
forbearance – and 
processes within the 
inter-firm partnership 
Softer aspects should 
not always be placed 
before structural 
factors in developing 
IJV businesses, let 
alone be treated as an 
‘end’ rather than a 
‘means’. 
Problems exist in the 
quantification of 
relational variables, 
the extant research is 
too general and 
diffuse 
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Game theory Alliances can be 
viewed as games 
whereby the outcome 
depends on what each 
player involved 
chooses to do;  pay-
offs from cheating 
may be greater than 
those from 
cooperating, and thus, 
partners may not 
cooperate fully 
Iteration of 
transactions can 
improve the prospects 
for cooperation by 
encouraging strategies 
of reciprocity.  
Recognition of duality 
between cooperation 
and competition.  
Distinction between 
situations in which 
cooperative strategy 
may be rewarding and 
in which it may be 
undermined 
Simplifying 
assumptions are made 
that distance game 
theory somewhat from 
reality:  e.g. 
personalities of the 
players, their social 
ties, communication 
between the players 
etc. 
Bargaining 
power 
(political 
economy) 
A sponsoring firm’s 
level of control and 
performance in an IJV 
business is contingent 
on bargaining power it 
accrues from 
resources and 
capabilities 
The interplay of power 
between the partners, 
their resources, goals, 
decision making 
control, and 
perceptions of 
equality, and the 
concept of productive 
exchange 
Firms recognize that 
power play does not 
increase the size of 
the pie for each 
partner and enable 
the most to be made 
from the joint 
opportunity. 
Problems with the 
quantification of 
power/dependence 
Organization
al learning/ 
knowledge 
IJVs represent a 
conduit through which 
firms can obtain tacit 
organizational 
knowledge embedded 
in others.  Firms form 
partnerships to 
capitalize on 
opportunities to 
acquire particular new 
skills 
How organizational 
knowledge possessed 
by the partners and 
IJV is used and 
managed;  procedures 
for information 
transfer, 
transformation and 
harvesting 
Learning is not a key 
factor for many firms 
engaged in IJVs;  
hence, learning 
outcomes may have 
little effect on IJV 
business performance. 
Quantitative study on 
the topic has not been 
able to elucidate how 
learning processes 
unfold over time. 
Perspective of 
‘learning race’ 
stresses competitive 
aspects, but neglects 
cooperative aspects 
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Strategic 
management 
IJVs are motivated by 
strategic behaviour in 
response to 
environmental 
conditions, and their 
performance hinges on 
whether a mutual co-
alignment/fit between 
parent strategy and 
venture structure is 
achieved 
Formative and 
structural aspects of 
the IJV are 
attributable to a focal 
parent’s competitive 
position/strategy 
along with important 
traits of its industry 
Lack of attention to 
the interactive 
relationship existing 
between partner 
firms. 
Firm homogeneity is 
unrealistically 
assumed 
 
2.2   Management control in JVs 
Merchant (1998) defined management control as “all the devices managers use to ensure 
that the behaviours and decisions of people in the organization are consistent with the 
organization’s objectives and strategies”.  In the following sections I will first present a 
model that provides an overall framework of analysis of a joint venture and thereby links 
management control mechanisms to JV characteristics.  Then I turn to an alternative way 
of looking at a joint venture, viz. as a balance between cooperation and competition;  that 
again will provide insights into what management control mechanisms should be in place. 
 
2.2.1  Dekker (2004): framework based on TCE and relational aspects 
Dekker (2003, 2004) has developed a theoretical framework for the analysis of control 
structures in inter-organizational relationships, such as alliances or joint ventures, based 
on a combination of transaction cost economics and relational aspects.  The framework is 
shown graphically in figure 1.  Dekker’s framework is structured around two control 
problems, ‘appropriation concerns’ and ‘coordination requirements’.  In ‘appropriation 
concerns’ one directly recognizes TCE theory, with its three determinants of governance 
structure, viz. asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency.  Note that in joint ventures the 
frequency of transactions must be sufficiently high to justify the formation of a JV, and 
therefore this dimension can be omitted in the further discussion.  Dekker states that a 
second purpose of control in inter-organizational relationships is the coordination of tasks 
between the partners:  “Different logics of value creation, as determined by the strategic 
rationale of an alliance, result in different levels of interdependence, requiring different 
degrees of mutual adaptation and adjustment” (Borys and Jemison 1989).  Coordination 
and joint decision-making will become more important the more interdependent and the 
more uncertain the tasks of the inter-organizational relationship.  Other authors have also 
reported on the importance of interdependence and task uncertainty as determinants of 
governance structure (e.g. Kumar and Seth 1998; Casciaro 2003). 
The control problems can be addressed by different types of control.  Here, one recognizes 
the three types of controls developed by Ouchi (1979):  the formal control mechanisms of 
outcome and behaviour control, and social or informal control.  Dekker’s framework 
suggests how control problems influence the need of partner firms not only to design and 
implement formal control mechanisms, but also to invest effort in selecting a good 
partner.   
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Interdependence
Coordination 
requirements
Appropriation 
concerns
Task uncertainty
Asset specificity
Environmental 
uncertainty
Frequency*
Partner selection
Goodwill trust
Capability trust
Outcome control
Behaviour control
Antecedents Control problems Social control Formal control
* Frequency is always high In joint ventures, and as such, 
this variable can be omitted in their analysis  
 
Figure 1:  Framework for analysis of control problems in inter-organizational relationships 
such as alliances and joint ventures (Dekker 2004). 
 
Selection of a good partner is a means to mitigate potential control problems upfront;  
design and implementation of formal controls is a means to manage the problems once the 
problems appear.  Dekker argues that investing more efforts in finding a good partner 
reduces the need for formal control mechanisms. 
 
An important aspect of this model is the role of trust, presented as an element of social 
control.  Figure 1 shows two types of trust, capability and goodwill trust.  This distinction 
was first proposed by Sako (1992), who in fact differentiated between three types of trust:  
contractual trust, capability trust and goodwill trust.  Contractual trust, the lowest, most 
basic level of trust, relates to the expectation that the other party will fulfil its 
contractual duties.  Contractual trust must be present in any joint venture relationship.  
Capability trust relates to the expectation that the other party will be competent and able 
to fulfil its promises satisfactorily.  Goodwill trust, the highest level of trust, relates to the 
expectation that the other party will perform in the interest of the relationship (the JV), 
even if it is not directly in the interest of the other party – in other words, in case of 
goodwill trust the other party will abstain from behaving opportunistically.  In Dekker’s 
model, capability trust influences the control mechanisms that govern the problem of 
coordination of tasks; goodwill trust, on the other hand, influences the mechanisms that 
govern the problem of appropriation concerns (opportunism). 
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The relationship between formal controls and trust in JVs is the subject of a substantial 
body of literature (for example, Zaheer and Venkatraman 1995;  Das and Teng 1998;  
Parkhe 1998;  Tomkins 2001; Poppo and Zenger 2002;  Poppo et al. 2007;  Dekker 2004;  
Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman 2006), representing a variety of views.  Van der 
Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman (2006) summarize this literature neatly.  They conclude that 
there are four different views.  The first is that trust might be a necessary condition for 
control structures and practices to become socially constructed.  A second position is that 
control structures and practices are themselves sources of trust.  Management control 
technologies perform a function similar to the legal system:  as with legal systems, 
management control mechanisms are put in place to reduce the risk of opportunistic 
behaviour.  A third alternative is that (formal) control mechanisms can help build trust.  
The information exchange that is facilitated by the use of (formal) controls could create 
positive expectations about future contributions to the relationship and in this way build 
trust (Tomkins 2001;  Poppo et al. 2007).  Finally, the last view is that trust is an 
alternative to control structures and practices;  in other words, trust can replace the 
design and implementation of control structures and practices.  The building of trust might 
be an efficient solution for control problems where the costs of market-based or hierarchy-
based controls are high, for example in transactions with high asset specificity and 
uncertainty (Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra 2006;  Dekker 2004;  Das and Teng 
2001).  Dekker (2004) takes this last position that trust is an alternative to control 
structures and practices.  He further argues that a higher level of trust has two 
consequences (see also figure 1):  trust in a partner may have a direct effect on the need 
for formal control mechanisms (i.e. the higher the level of trust, the lower the need for 
formal controls), and it may have a moderating effect on the relationship between control 
problems and the use of formal control mechanisms. 
 
Dekker confirmed his theoretical framework with case study research.  I will come back to 
this in chapter 4 of this paper. 
 
2.2.2  Zeng (2003): framework based on game theory and its ‘cooperative dilemma’ 
An aspect that has thus far received little attention in the joint venture literature is the 
fundamental challenge for JV management to balance cooperation and competition among 
the partners.  In a joint venture the partners should cooperate to achieve the JV 
objectives and hence achieve the desired value creation (‘growing the pie’).  On the other 
hand, partners will – almost naturally – compete to divide the anticipated benefits 
(‘getting the largest slice of the pie’).  Much of the literature has emphasized either the 
cooperative or the competitive side.  Many authors have argued that JV management is 
about creating good relationships between partners and building trust (see for example the 
previous section (Dekker 2004), or Killing (1983)).  On the other end of the spectrum are 
those who have focused on the competitive side, often in the context of organizational 
learning, whereby one partner attempts to absorb capabilities of the other partner(s) 
(Hamel 1991).  Once that objective is fulfilled, it often means the end of the JV.  Zeng 
(2003) argues that these two perspectives – cooperation and competition – should be 
combined, as each perspective on its own emphasizes only one side of what he calls the 
‘cooperative dilemma’ of joint ventures.  The cooperative perspective stresses the role of 
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cooperation and trust to ensure the desired value creation, but neglects, for example, the 
hidden cost of cooperative behaviour.  The competitive perspective, on the other hand, 
overlooks the fact that a joint venture is a positive sum game, rather than a zero-sum 
game, as well as the fact that if all partners would behave in order to learn from the other 
partners this would have a detrimental impact on JV performance. 
 
Game theory offers a theoretical ground to further investigate the tension between 
cooperation and competition in joint ventures.  It provides a means to assess the likely 
consequences of competitive and cooperative behaviours in conditions where the benefits 
to one player depend on what the other players do.  A central theme in game theory is the 
prisoner’s dilemma:  a situation where the optimal joint outcome can only be achieved 
through trusting cooperation.  A joint venture can be regarded as an iterated prisoner’s 
dilemma (Phelan et al. 2005;  Parkhe 1993a, 1993b).  JV partners will generally be 
concerned not to lose, and hence reluctant to reveal information;  cooperation may 
therefore seem unlikely.  However there is also an incentive to cooperate since the game 
is generally a non-zero-sum game (e.g. because of economies of scale), and it is known 
that the game will be played not once but over an extended period of time, so that a firm 
that does not cooperate (i.e. ‘cheats’) can be punished for its behaviour in the next round.  
Therefore, partner firms have an incentive to act opportunistically in the short term, but 
may learn to cooperate in repeated encounters.  The immediate gain of the strategy of 
cheating is weighed against the sacrifice of future gains as a result of violating the 
agreement.  The longer the time horizon of a joint venture, the closer it gets to a 
repeated game. 
 
As indicated, only few authors have used game theory for analysis of JVs.  I will present 
the framework of Zeng (2003) as it contains most detail.  The starting point for his model 
is formed by the two most robust solutions for the prisoner’s dilemma:  changing the pay-
off matrix and extending the shadow of the future.  The pay-off matrix shows the potential 
rewards for cooperative and competitive behaviour.  The higher the pay-off for 
cooperation relative to competition, the more likely it is that the partners will cooperate; 
in contrast, spill-overs will lead to a smaller difference in pay-off between cooperation and 
competition.  The shadow of the future refers to the time frame for decision making in a 
game.  As described earlier, if a prisoner’s dilemma is played indefinitely, cooperation 
between the players will emerge.  This is because the players have the possibility – in 
future interactions – to reward or punish each other for previous behaviour (in contrast to 
a single game).  Thus, the longer this shadow of the future, the higher the pay-off will be 
from future cooperation and the more likely it is that partners will cooperate in the 
present.  Zeng developed a number of hypotheses about factors that might promote 
cooperation among joint venture partners.  These are listed in figure 2.  Zeng confirmed 
his hypotheses by means of statistical analysis on a large sample of joint ventures. 
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Competition between 
alliance partners
Shadow of the 
future
Protection of partner 
contributions
Anticipated duration 
of alliance
Ease of evaluating 
partner performance
Similarity in 
organiz. cultures
Pay-off matrix
Balance in mutual 
dependences
Continuous 
contributions
Cooperative 
dilemma
H1: A firm is less likely to cooperate with its partner, the 
more they compete with each other
H2: A firm is more likely to cooperate with its partner, the 
better its contributions to the joint venture are protected
H5: Partners are more likely to cooperate with each other, 
the longer the anticipated duration of the alliance
H4: A firm is more likely to cooperate with its partner, 
if it relies on continuous contributions from its partner
H3: A firm is less likely to cooperate with its partner, the 
more dependent it is on its partner than its partner is on it
H6: A firm is less likely to cooperate with its partner, the 
more difficult it is to evaluate the performance of its 
partner
H7: A firm is more likely to cooperate with its partner, the 
more similar are their organizational cultures/ structures
Hypotheses Graphical presentation  of model structure
 
 
Figure 2:  Hypotheses about the cooperative dilemma based on game theory (left) and a 
graphical representation of the model structure (right), based on Zeng (2003) 
 
 
3.   Hypothesis development 
In this chapter I will argue that the framework developed by Dekker (2004) can be 
extended by using game theory.  The hypotheses about factors influencing the cooperative 
dilemma, as developed by Zeng (2003), in fact present a different way of looking at the 
control problem of appropriation concerns from TCE theory. 
 
Although in the previous chapter TCE theory was classified as an economic theory and 
game theory as an organizational/relational theory (table 1), the logic behind both 
theories has certain similarities.  First, it should be noted that both theories are based on 
similar assumptions on human behaviour, i.e. bounded rationality and opportunistic 
behaviour.  Second, in table 2 I demonstrate how the hypotheses from game theory, as 
developed by Zeng (2003), can be explained in terms of elements of TCE theory.  It 
appears that all hypotheses either link back to asset specificity or to (various aspects of) 
uncertainty.  Finally, two specific problems known from the prisoner’s dilemma in game 
theory – the problems of hold-up and spill-overs – can also be explained in TCE terms.  To 
maximize a partner firm’s share of the JV benefits, a firm can use bargaining power.  
However, the use of bargaining power is constrained by the ‘hold-up’ problem:  if the firm 
becomes (too) dependent on the other partners in the JV, it will lose its bargaining power 
and fall victim to potentially opportunistic behaviour by the other partners (Zeng 2003).   
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Table 2:  Hypotheses from game theory explained in terms of transaction characteristics 
from transaction cost economics  
 
Hypotheses from Zeng (2003)* Comments 
Changing the pay-off matrix 
H1: A firm is more likely to 
cooperate with its partner, if they 
compete less with each other 
If the parent firms compete little, uncertainty from 
concerns about opportunistic behaviour is small 
H2: A firm is more likely to 
cooperate with its partner, the 
better its contributions to the joint 
venture are protected 
If contributions from parents are well-protected, 
uncertainty stemming from concerns about 
opportunistic behaviour of the other parents will be 
small or negligible 
H3: A firm is more likely to 
cooperate with its partner, the less 
dependent it is on its partner than its 
partner is on it 
If there is a good balance between contributions 
from the partners in a JV, asset specificity concerns 
become small (or rather:  such concerns are 
balanced/equal for all partners) 
Extending the ‘shadow of the future’ 
H4: A firm is more likely to 
cooperate with its partner, if it 
relies on continuous contributions 
from its partner 
If continuous contributions from the parents are 
required, asset specificity concerns become small 
5: Partners are more likely to 
cooperate with each other, the 
longer the anticipated duration of 
the alliance 
If the intended duration of the alliance is long, this 
reduces uncertainty stemming from not knowing 
what the partner is up to 
H6: A firm is more likely to 
cooperate with its partner, the 
easier it is to evaluate the 
performance of its partner 
If it is easy to evaluate the performance of the 
partner(s), information asymmetries are small or 
negligible, which means in turn that uncertainty 
resulting from information asymmetries is small or 
negligible 
H7: A firm is more likely to 
cooperate with its partner, the more 
similar are their organizational 
cultures/structures 
If partners have similar organizational cultures and 
structures, uncertainty stemming from such 
differences will be small 
* Some of the original hypotheses of Zeng have been modified so that now they are all 
formulated in the positive sense, i.e. starting with “A firm is more likely to...” 
 
 
This can happen, for example, if one of the partners has invested in specific assets for the 
joint venture and cannot exit the JV without an important loss.  In other words:  the ‘hold-
up’ problem relates to the problem of asset specificity in TCE theory.  The other way to 
maximize a firm’s benefits from the JV is by using the knowledge acquired through the JV 
in other activities: this is the so-called ‘spill-over’ problem.  Spill-overs can be considered 
as one of the components of uncertainty in TCE theory (uncertainty about the – 
opportunistic – behaviour of the other partner firm(s)).  Thus a partner in a JV has various 
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options to take actions that undermine cooperation, for example withholding information 
or refraining from JV investments.  In general, it can be stated that a partner firm in a JV 
is less likely to cooperate with the other partner(s) the larger the asset specificity and the 
larger the uncertainty. 
 
Summarizing, Zeng’s cooperative dilemma provides a refinement of Dekker’s control 
problem of appropriation concerns.  The hypotheses as formulated by Zeng – when turned 
into statements – can be used to investigate the potential for a cooperative dilemma in a 
joint venture.  This ‘extended framework’, combining Dekker and Zeng, is presented in 
figure 3.  Dekker’s control problem of appropriation concerns has been replaced by the 
cooperative dilemma.  Rather than three variables (or even only two, since frequency is 
not a variable in the case of JVs), it now has seven variables.  Especially when 
appropriation concerns are high for a given JV, this extension with game theory can 
provide more granularity when investigating potential control issues.  The larger the 
dilemma, the more or more stringent control mechanisms are required to address the 
problem.  In addition, the larger the dilemma, the higher the need for formal control 
mechanisms (as opposed to social controls), since social mechanisms will not be able to 
address the problem. 
 
As far as trust is concerned, in the combined model, I shall assume that trust and formal 
controls are partly substitutes and partly complements.  In case of high capability trust, 
fewer formal controls will be required to manage the problem of coordination of tasks 
(trust as substitute);  but in case of high capability trust (but low goodwill trust), 
appropriation concerns still need to be covered by formal controls (trust as complement).   
 
It should be noted that in the research of Dekker, the focus is purely on explaining 
patterns of management control in JVs, given the organizational and environmental 
context in which the JV operates.  This also holds for other authors who have published 
research in this area, such as Groot and Merchant (2000) and Kamminga (2003).  Dekker 
does mention however that “underlying the theoretical framework is the assumption that 
aligning the alliance’s governance structure with its transaction and task characteristics 
will result in higher performance”.  In a later study of supplier-buyer relationships, Dekker 
tested this hypothesis (Anderson and Dekker 2005), and found, by means of statistical 
analysis, that the data indeed lent support to the hypothesis that alignment between the 
anticipated transaction hazards (i.e. control problems) and the management control 
structure corresponded with better performance compared to a situation of misalignment.  
Thus, the mentioned hypothesis that alignment between JV characteristics and 
management control mechanisms leads to better performance is plausible. 
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Figure 3:  Framework developed in this paper, extending the framework from Dekker 
(2004) with hypothesis derived from game theory by Zeng (2003) 
 
 
4.   Case study 
 
I will test the extended framework in a case study.  The research design is that of an 
explanatory case study (Yin 1989), i.e. the theoretical model described in the previous 
chapter is used to understand and explain the reasons for management control practices in 
joint ventures.  I will explore the same case study that Dekker used to illustrate his model 
and will thereby rely fully on the information provided by Dekker (2004)40.  I first provide a 
brief introduction to this case study, based on Dekker’s paper, followed by a description of 
findings from analysis with Dekker’s framework.  Finally I show how the model developed 
in this paper enhances the level of detail of Dekker’s original analysis. 
 
                                             
40 In my Master’s thesis I explore three different cases, of three international joint ventures – two 
manufacturing joint ventures and one in financial services.  The findings from these three cases confirm the 
extended framework and show that adding the perspective of game theory is beneficial to understanding 
management control in JVs.  However, because of confidentiality reasons, I cannot present these cases in this 
paper.   
I therefore illustrate the extended model by exploring the example provided by Dekker (2004).  Although 
Dekker’s case study concerns a supplier-buyer alliance, he indicates that “the structure of the alliance has 
much in common with a joint venture.  Joint financial investments are made, a separate organizational 
structure with a joint board and joint task groups is installed, specific tasks and resources are dedicated to it, 
and separate rules, regulations and costing and non-market pricing are used.” 
 194
4.1   Background 
Dekker’s case concerns a strategic alliance between two companies, NMA and RIB.  NMA is 
a Dutch company supplying components for railway safety.  RIB is an organisation 
responsible for construction, installation and maintenance of the Dutch rail infrastructure, 
and was formed when the Dutch Railways were privatized in 1995.  NMA is monopolist in 
The Netherlands.  RIB is its largest domestic customer and accounts for a significant share 
of NMA’s total turnover.  When RIB was formed, the new management recognized that 
many of its supply chains were inefficient, and an important goal for RIB became better 
control of purchasing costs.  As a test case, RIB initiated an alliance with NMA for half-
barrier installations.  NMA was chosen for several reasons.  First, significant cost 
reductions were expected by reorganizing the supply chain.  Second, because of the 
delivery risks for this type of product (monopolistic supply situation and serious 
consequences of inadequate delivery) a long-term supply relationship was deemed a good 
option.  Third, the alliance seemed a good route towards more market orientation and cost 
consciousness within the RIB organization.  And finally, RIB expected that NMA would be a 
good cultural fit given their long history of cooperation. 
 
The contract that was set up covered the various aspects of the cooperation in detail.  It 
included e.g. scope, goals, plans for achieving those goals, organizational structure, 
responsibilities of both parties, exchange of information, distribution and protection of 
intellectual property rights and a financial incentive system.  Several appendices to the 
contract covered very specific items such as product descriptions and prices, a quality plan 
and a programme of improvement for coordination of innovation activities.  These 
appendices were revised annually.  The goal of the alliance was defined as the joint 
innovation of half-barrier installation systems to realize additional cost savings and to 
enhance its quality and safety.  Some of the key elements of the management control 
structure were the following: 
 Organizational structure:  the alliance was set up as a separate organizational entity, 
with an alliance board (two members of each firm) and alliance staff.  The board set 
out an alliance strategy and was responsible for turning strategy into action by 
agreeing short-term goals and an improvement programme (see below). 
 Programme of improvement:  for each innovation proposal, the programme of 
improvement prescribed a planning and progress scheme (specifying steps such as 
definition of functional requirements, attainability study, development etc.), a budget 
scheme, an estimation of the expected cost reduction, and a quality plan.   
 Financial incentive system:  an ‘alliance fund’ was set up to ensure mutual 
collaborative behaviour in the innovation process, in other words, to ensure that the 
partners’ individual financial objectives were aligned with the alliance’s objectives.  
This was done by setting up a scheme such that all planned innovations were financed 
from a central fund, financial results were accrued and the residual was divided 
following a pre-set schedule. 
 Protection of proprietary knowledge:  NMA’s knowledge of the half-barrier installations 
was regarded a key factor for the success of the alliance.  Therefore the contract 
specified that NMA would place its knowledge and experience at the disposal of the 
alliance.  NMA was also assigned all intellectual property rights on the installations and 
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developments generated by the alliance.  In return RIB received a non-transferable 
license for the use of the technology. 
 
4.2   Analysis with Dekker’s framework 
Dekker showed that the control mechanisms in place can be explained on the basis of the 
two control problems, coordination of tasks and of appropriation concerns.  Table 3 
contains the various control elements present in the NMA-RIB case.  Below I discuss them 
briefly. 
 
Coordination of tasks was needed for the two alliance activities of supply of half-barrier 
systems to RIB and innovation.  The supply task required controls such as standard ordering 
procedures and demand forecasts.  The innovation task was more complex and 
characterized by higher uncertainty.  Control instruments to address this problem included 
a separate hierarchical organizational structure with a joint alliance board and joint task 
groups, with decision rights and responsibilities;  short-term goals for these task groups set 
by the board;  task planning, budgeting and progress evaluation of the programme of 
improvement;  and quality plans with annual auditing of their use.  Management of 
appropriation concerns was done among others via the alliance fund.  Although there was 
strong mutual dependency – RIB could not switch to alternative systems without incurring 
considerable cost and NMA could not switch to other buyers –, thus aligning the partners’ 
interests, RIB was concerned NMA would have little incentive to work actively on 
innovation of the half-barrier systems and would simply use the alliance to secure 
turnover.  NMA, in turn, was concerned it would not receive a fair share of the realized 
cost benefits.  Therefore the alliance fund was set up such that it provided benefits to 
both parties.  Furthermore the joint supervision of the alliance activities, with joint 
decision making and problem solving helped manage appropriation concerns.  Finally, the 
clear specification in the contract of intellectual property rights and how to handle them, 
contributed to minimizing NMA’s concerns about information spill-over to the alliance. 
 
As far as trust is concerned, the NMA-RIB case is not fully conclusive.  Dekker’s framework 
is built on the assumption that trust can be a substitute for formal controls.  However, the 
case shows that trust is certainly not fully exchangeable with control.  Even though the 
level of trust was very high (supported by facts such as RIB obtaining full insight into the 
cost structure of the half-barrier installations), there were many formal controls in place 
(e.g. a very complete contract).  In other words, a high level of trust does not necessarily 
lead to fewer formal controls.  On the other hand, a high number of formal controls does 
not need to be detrimental to the level of trust.  This lends support to the statement that 
trust is at least partially a complement to formal controls, rather than a substitute. 
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Table 3:  Formal and informal control mechanisms in the NMA-RIB alliance (Dekker 2004)* 
Outcome control Behaviour control Social control 
Ex ante mechanisms   
Goal setting: Structural specifications: Partner selection: 
- Strategic goals (CT) - Ordering and supply 
procedures 
- Long  joint history and 
cultural ‘fit’ 
- Short-term goals (e.g. for  (CT) Interactive goal setting (AC): 
cost reductions) (CT) - Demand forecasts (CT) - Joint governance design 
Incentive systems: - Functional specifications 
(CT) 
- Short-term goals 
- Alliance fund (AC) - Programme of innovations 
(CT) 
Reputation: 
 - Quality plans (CT) - Trustworthiness for other 
alliances 
 - Specification and division of Trust: 
 intellectual property rights 
(AC) 
- Long-lasting relationship 
 Organizational structuring: - Reputation RIB 
 - Alliance board (CT) - Open book agreement 
 - Task groups (CT) - Intentional incomplete 
contracting 
   
Ex post mechanisms   
Performance monitoring Behaviour monitoring: Shared decision making & goal 
setting 
- Open book accounting 
(AC) 
- Pre-action review of 
innovation  
- Joint alliance board (CT) 
 ideas (AC) - Joint task groups (CT) 
Rewarding: - Board monitoring (AC)  
- Benefit sharing - Auditing use of quality plans 
(CT) 
 
   
* CT indicates that the mechanism governs primarily the control problem of ‘coordination of 
tasks’,  
and AC the control problem of appropriation concerns 
 
 
4.3   Analysis with the extended framework developed in this paper 
I now analyse Dekker’s case based on the framework developed by Zeng (2003).  Table 4 
explains the seven parameters derived from game theory for the case of the NMA-RIB 
alliance.  The table shows clearly that the control mechanisms in the NMA-RIB alliance 
were designed such those areas where potential control problems could arise, were 
covered adequately.  Two potentially problematic areas were ensuring continuous 
contributions from both partners, and being capable to evaluate partner performance in 
the alliance.  These were addressed with additional control measures.  An alliance fund 
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was set up to ensure that both partners would contribute to (and benefit from) the primary 
objective of the alliance, i.e. cost reduction;  a programme of innovation was set up with a 
specific, tight governance structure to ensure the other objective of the alliance was being 
worked by both partners.  Furthermore, both parties gave insight into their work practices 
(e.g. product specifications) and cost figures (e.g. open book accounting), and several 
issues were worked together in the joint venture;  this enabled both parties to evaluate 
each other’s performance. 
 
Extending Dekker’s framework with game theory – the hypotheses developed by Zeng 
(2003) – thus helps in explaining in more detail the control mechanisms in place, and 
matching them to underlying control problems.  In the case of the NMA-RIB alliance, 
Dekker found that the control mechanisms could be explained based on the control 
problems of coordination of tasks and appropriation concerns and their underlying 
antecedents.  The extended model shows that replacing the problem of appropriation 
concerns by the cooperative dilemma and its determining factors can explain the control 
mechanisms in place better and in more detail.  It also confirms that the control 
mechanisms match the control problems and therefore it is likely that this alliance 
functions successfully.  This link between a match of control mechanisms with alliance 
characteristics and alliance performance could, however, not be substantiated in this case 
due to the lack of sufficient data. 
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Table 4:  Hypotheses from game theory applied to the NMA-RIB alliance 
Changing the pay-off matrix 
H1: A firm is more likely to 
cooperate with its partner, if they 
compete less with each other 
NMA and RIB were not competing at all, they 
operated in different (product) markets  Æ  
positive impact on cooperation 
H2: A firm is more likely to 
cooperate with its partner, the 
better its contributions to the joint 
venture are protected 
In setting up the JV (and the JV contract), 
specific attention was paid to aspects of 
intellectual property so that NMA did not 
need to be concerned about information spill-
over  Æ  positive impact on cooperation 
H3: A firm is more likely to 
cooperate with its partner, the less 
dependent it is on its partner than its 
partner is on it 
There was a mutual dependency between 
NMA and RIB: NMA was the only supplier to 
RIB, whereas RIB was the most important 
customer of NMA.  In other words, NMA did 
not depend more on RIB than RIB depended 
on NMA  Æ  positive impact on cooperation 
Extending the ‘shadow of the future’ 
H4: A firm is more likely to 
cooperate with its partner, if it 
relies on continuous contributions 
from its partner 
RIB was concerned NMA would use the 
alliance to simply secure turnover, and NMA 
was concerned to earn a fair share of the cost 
savings and to realize sufficient turnover.  
Therefore, specific measures were taken, i.e. 
the programme of innovation and the alliance 
fund   
Æ  positive impact on cooperation 
5: Partners are more likely to 
cooperate with each other, the 
longer the anticipated duration of 
the alliance 
When setting up the alliance, the partners 
had a long time horizon in mind  Æ  positive 
impact on cooperation 
H6: A firm is more likely to 
cooperate with its partner, the 
easier it is to evaluate the 
performance of its partner 
Specific measures taken by the alliance 
included intensive exchange of data as well as 
personnel, and ‘open book accounting’, 
enabling each partner to evaluate the 
performance of the alliance and of the other 
partner  Æ  positive impact on cooperation 
H7: A firm is more likely to 
cooperate with its partner, the more 
similar are their organizational 
cultures/structures 
One of the reasons of RIB for selecting NMA 
was the long history of cooperation and a 
good cultural fit between the organizations  
Æ  positive impact on cooperation 
 
 
5.   Conclusions 
From a confrontation of an actual case with the theoretical framework, it has become 
clear that the extended model has proven adequate in explaining the observed control 
patterns as well as the observed control problems.  Whereas the two original control 
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problems, coordination of tasks and appropriation concerns, appear sufficient to explain 
the observed (formal and social) control mechanisms, replacing the problem of 
appropriation concerns by the cooperative dilemma from game theory adds further to the 
analysis – it provides an additional layer of granularity.  The hypotheses derived from game 
theory are useful to further investigate the situation in terms of potential opportunism, 
and at the same time they provide indications of how potential concerns can be addressed:  
how to change the pay-off matrix and how to extend the shadow of the future in favour of 
more cooperation at the expense of competition.  As such, the extended model can serve 
as a diagnostic tool to assess the joint venture management control mechanisms in place 
and provides more detail and clearer indications of how to close control gaps than the 
original model by Dekker. 
 
The work presented in this paper also has some shortcomings.  Dekker (2004) already 
mentioned that the role of trust and especially the relationship between trust and formal 
controls needs further attention;  the extended model presented in this paper does not 
add any further insights on this point.  Further work could take the form of a longitudinal 
study, to look at the development of trust and how it impacts other control mechanisms.  
Furthermore, the link from a good match between management control pattern and joint 
venture characteristics to joint venture performance remains to be substantiated further.  
Again, further work could consist of a longitudinal study or a statistical analysis of a 
sample of different joint ventures. 
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